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Abstract
The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behavior by par-
ticipants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive constraints on the design space.
But in bridging from theory to practice, it often becomes necessary to relax incentive constraints
in order to allow tradeo↵s with other desirable properties. This paper surveys a number of dif-
ferent options that can be adopted in relaxing incentive constraints, providing a current view of
the state-of-the-art.
1 Introduction
Mechanism design theory formally characterizes institutions for the purpose of establishing rules
that engender desirable outcomes in settings with multiple, self-interested agents each with private
information about their preferences. In the context of mechanism design, an institution is formalized
as a framework wherein messages are received from agents and outcomes selected on the basis of
these messages. The messages represent claims by agents about their private information.
A very simple example is given by an auction, where the messages are bids and provide state-
ments about willingness to pay and the outcome allocates the item to an agent and determines the
payment. A central tenet of mechanism design is that agents will play an equilibrium of the game
induced by their preferences, beliefs about the preferences of other agents, and the rules of the
game that are implied by the design of the institution. Since the seminal work of Hurwicz [1972],
the standard way in which design proceeds is through imposing incentive constraints on the design
problem.
In particular, the optimal design is identiﬁed amongst the possible designs that are incentive
compatible, in that it is an equilibrium for each agent to report its private information truthfully.
What is important is not that a designer insists on on truthful revelation per se. Rather, the
incentive constraints capture the idea that properties of mechanisms are studied in an equilibrium.
This broader view follows from the revelation principle, which allows a focus on incentive compatible
mechanisms without loss of generality, once one adopts an equilibrium-based design stance. The
revelation principle establishes that any properties obtained in the equilibrium of a mechanism can
also be obtained in the truthful equilibrium of an incentive compatible mechanism.
Various concepts of equilibrium can be adopted for the purpose of mechanism design. The
strongest concept is dominant-strategy equilibrium, where each agent’s best response is invariant
1to the reports made by other agents. Amongst incentive compatible mechanisms, those that admit
this solution concept are strategyproof, meaning that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy
equilibrium. For example, a second-price auction, where the item is sold to the highest bidder but
for the second highest bid amount, is strategyproof.
Strategyproofness is a property with strong theoretical and practical interest. Some of the
reasons for its appeal include:
(P1) Simplicity: participants do not need to model, or counterspeculate about, the behavior of
other participants.
(P2) Dynamic Stability: In dynamic contexts, participants do not need to modify their reports in
response to changes of the reports by other agents.
(P3) Advice and Fairness: Normative advice can be provided to participants, and strategyproof
mechanisms are fair in the sense that gaming is neither possible nor advantageous.
(P4) Robustness: Strategyproofness provides a prediction about behavior that is robust to as-
sumptions about agent beliefs.
(P5) Empirical analysis: Reported preferences can be reasonably assumed to be truthful, which
enables empirical work, for the purpose of public policy and also for adjusting mechanism
parameters or ongoing redesign.
These properties have been discussed in many places; see for example [Azevedo and Budish,
2012; Pathak and S¨ onmez, 2008; Abdulkdiroˇ glu et al., 2006]. Some of these properties have been
decisive in selecting mechanisms for real-world applications.1
1.1 The Case for Relaxing Strategyproofness
On the other hand, there are theoretical reasons to want to look for an alternative to full strate-
gyproofness. Some of the objections from theory include:
(U1) Impossibility theorems: For example, strategyproofness precludes stable matching [Roth,
1982], core-selecting combinatorial auctions [Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002; Ausubel and
Milgrom, 2002], non-dictatorial voting rules [Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975], and e -
cient, individual-rational and no-deﬁcit double auctions [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983].
(U2) Analytical bottleneck: For example, the problem of characterizing the optimal strategyproof
mechanism for maximizing revenue in combinatorial auctions (even on two items) remains
open, and the problem of characterizing the maximally e cient, strategyproof combinatorial
exchange (that runs without incurring a deﬁcit) remains open. Generally speaking, it has
proved di cult to handle incentive constraints for domains in which agent’s preferences are
“multi-dimensional,” in the sense that they are represented by more than a single number.
1For example, in the context of public school choice, where matching mechanisms are used to assign high school
students to schools, public o cials cited the fairness that comes from removing the need for gaming on the part of
students as a signiﬁcant advantage in adopting a deferred-acceptance approach in favor of the status quo mecha-
nism [Pathak and S¨ onmez, 2008].
2(U3) Bad computational properties: For example, strategyproofness precludes polynomial-time
constant-factor approximation schemes for the combinatorial public projects problem [Pa-
padimitriou et al., 2008], and a sequence of related results that establish a gap between what
is possible to achieve in polynomial time with and without incentive constraints exist for
combinatorial auctions; see Blumrosen and Nisan [2007] for a survey.
In addition, strategyproof mechanisms can be complex to describe or implement, and require
a fully general language with which agents can report their preferences. Simpler mechanisms
may be preferred in practice, even if the strategic complexity is increased. Moreover, while there
are few examples of strategyproof mechanisms used in practice, mechanisms with di↵erent kinds
of partial strategyproofness are quite typical. In public school choice, it is common to adopt
deferred acceptance algorithms for matching students to schools. But they are sometimes used with
truncated preference lists, which precludes strategyproofness [Pathak and S¨ onmez, 2012]. In auction
design, the “generalized second price” (GSP) auction for selling ads adjacent to internet search
engine results [Edelman et al., 2007] and the uniform price auctions for U.S. Treasury debt [Cramton
and Ausubel, 2002] lack strategyproofness and are adopted for other reasons. However they both
exhibit one of the signature elements associated with strategyproof mechanisms: payments depend
only on the bids of others and not on a player’s own report, which improves the incentive properties.
Given the above, there is growing interest in developing a theory of mechanism design in which
the incentive constraints are relaxed. Certainly, strategyproofness is a powerful property when it
can be achieved. However, it is undeniably strong; for example, a mechanism in which one agent
can on one occasion gain a small beneﬁt from a deviation is not strategyproof. But what if agents
are poorly informed about the reports of others, or what if strategic behavior is costly (e.g., due to
the cost of information to predict what others will do)?
Ultimately, we’d like to replace strategyproofness, where necessary, with a design approach
that still retains properties (P1)–(P5), while being responsive to the aforementioned concerns. In
particular, desirable properties for a new theory of approximate strategyproofness include:
(P6) Tradeo↵ Enabling: In view of impossibility theorems, a useful theory should enable a tradeo↵
between strategyproofness and other economic and computational properties.
(P7) Design Tractability: In view of the di culty of designing optimal, strategyproof mechanisms,
a useful theory should simplify the design problem.
(P8) Explanatory power: In view of the relative lack of strategyproof mechanisms in practice, a
useful theory should explain the design features of mechanisms that are used in practice.
A side note: One might wonder whether the relaxation to Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and its
associated concept of Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility (BNIC) is useful as a work around for
the challenges (U1)–(U3) involved in strategyproof design. Although this can help in regard to
(U1), BNIC loses many of the beneﬁts of strategyproofness, at least (P1), (P2), (P4) and (P5),
and arguably (P3). Most practioners accept that Bayes-Nash equilibrium do not provide a robust
enough prediction of behavior to guide practical design; see [Erdil and Klemperer, 2010]. Moreover,
mechanisms that are BNIC but not strategyproof are necessarily fragile in that they depend on
the designer having adopted accurate beliefs in regard to agent preferences. They fail Wilson’s
real-world design mandate to be “detail free” [Wilson, 1987].
Continuing, we introduce relevant notation and formal concepts from strategyproof mechanism
design theory, before continuing to discuss di↵erent notions of approximate strategyproofness. In
3closing, we provide a brief summary and consider next steps. Readers looking for a more gentle
introduction to mechanism design theory will beneﬁt from Jackson [2003].
2 Strategyproof Mechanisms
Consider N = {1,...,n} agents, each self interested and with private information about their
preferences, and a set A = {a1,...,a m} of alternatives. For example, the agents may be voters
or bidders, and the alternatives might represent di↵erent candidates in an election or di↵erent
allocations of resources.2 A basic dichotomy exists in mechanism design between domains with
money, and thus the ability to transfer utility between agents, and domains without money.
In domains without money (such as public school choice), each agent has a strict preference
order  i2 L on alternatives, where L is the set of all such preferences. A preference proﬁle   =
( 1,..., n) is an element of Ln.
It is also useful to associate each agent with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
ui : A ! [0,1]. Given preference order  i,t h e nw er e q u i r eui 2 U i,w h e r eU i is the set of
representative utility functions for preferences  i, such that if aj  i ak then ui(aj) >u i(ak).
Given this, a mechanism (f)i sd e ﬁ n e db yachoice rule f : Ln ! A. Each agent makes a claim
about its preference order, and on the basis of the reports an alternative is selected. A strategyproof
mechanism has the property that,
ui(f( i,  i))   ui(f( 0
i,  i)), 8i,8  i,8  0
i,8   i, (1)
where ui 2 U i and   i=(  1,..., i 1, i+1,..., n) denotes a preference proﬁle without agent i.
Preference order  i denotes the true preference order of agent i and  0
i denotes a possible misreport.
In words, no agent can beneﬁt by misreporting its preference order whatever the reports of other
agents.
In domains with money (such as auctions) we assume quasi-linear utility functions, ui : A ⇥
R ! R, such that ui(aj,t) 2 R is an agent’s utility for alternative aj and payment t 2 R, and
ui(aj,t)=vi(aj)   t where vi : V ⌘ A ! R denotes an agent’s valuation function. Quasi-linearity
insists that an agent’s utility is linear in payment, and allows the valuation to be interpreted in
monetary units. A valuation proﬁle v =( v1,...,v n) is an element of V n,w h e r eV is domain of
valuation functions.
Given this, a mechanism (f,p)i sd e ﬁ n e db yachoice rule f : V n ! A and a payment rule
p : V n ! Rn. Based on reports ˆ vi from each agent i, a mechanism selects alternative f(ˆ v) and
collects payment pi(ˆ v) from each agent i.Astrategyproof mechanism has the property that,
vi(f(vi,v  i))   pi(vi,v  i)   vi(f(v0
i,v  i))   pi(v0
i,v  i), 8i,8vi,8v0
i,8v i, (2)
where v i =( v1,...,v i 1,v i+1,...,v n) denotes a valuation proﬁle without agent i. In words, no
agent can beneﬁt by deviating from truthful reporting whatever the reports of others.
For both domains with and without money, we assume symmetry, so that the preference (or
valuation) domain is the same for all agents, and choice and payment rules are invariant to permu-
tations of the preference (or valuation) proﬁle. This is for expositional purposes.
2Generally speaking there can be a continuum on alternatives, but we adopt a ﬁnite set for expositional clarity.
4Sometimes the rules of a mechanism are randomized. In this case, the deﬁnition of strat-
egyproofness can be generalized in the obvious way, to either hold in expectation or for every
possible random draw. Further, we can also have a prior on preferences, denoted D 24 (Ln) (or
D 24 (V n)), where 4 denotes the probability simplex. In these cases, we insist that the prior is
symmetric with respect to agents (but allow for correlated preferences).
Examples. In a domain without money, well known strategyproof mechanisms include:
• Median mechanism: For example, alternatives are the location of a ﬁre station on a [0,1]
line, and each agent has a most preferred alternative and preferences that are monotonically
decreasing away from this alternative. The median mechanism locates the ﬁre station at the
median location amongst the set of reports of most-preferred locations. This is strategyproof
and Pareto optimal.
• Random serial dictatorship: For example, n rooms are to be assigned to n students. Stu-
dents are placed into a random priority order and assigned the most preferred room of those
remaining, according to reported preference orders. This is strategyproof and Pareto optimal.
In a domain with money, well known strategyproof mechanisms include:
• Second-price auction: For example, a painting is sold to the highest bidder for the second
highest price. This is strategyproof and allocatively e cient.
• Take-it-or-leave-it: For example, multiple paintings are sold, and bidders placed into a random
priority order. In priority order, each bidder is o↵ered remaining paintings and sold the bundle
of paintings that maximizes its utility given its reported valuation function and the price on
each painting, with prices updated by the auctioneer based on previous o↵ers and responses.
This is strategyproof.
3 Quantitative Measures of Susceptibility
In this section, we survey di↵erent, quantitative measures of approximate strategyproofness that
have appeared in the literature or are simple combinations of existing ideas.
These quantiﬁed susceptibility measures3 di↵er along two dimensions:
1. The informational stance: Are agents assumed to be well-informed about the reports of other
agents (motivating ex post regret) or do agents have uncertainty about the reports of other
agents (motivating interim regret)?
2. The worst-case vs. probabilistic stance: Is the designer assumed to have strict uncertainty
about agent preferences (motivating worst-case measures), or does the designer have a (per-
haps inaccurate) probabilistic model of agent preferences with which to guide design (moti-
vating expected-value and percentile based measures)?
Along the second dimension we also consider an intermediate analysis approach in terms of
worst-case IID beliefs. Here, the susceptibility measures are deﬁned in the worst case over all
3This terminology is adopted from Carroll [2011b].
5possible preference distributions, under the restriction that agent’s preferences are independently
and identically sampled from the same distribution.
It bears emphasis that there are two di↵erent viewpoints under consideration when categorizing
di↵erent approaches to approximate strategyproofness: that of an agent and that of a designer (or
planner). These can be combined in di↵erent ways, for example the overall stance can be that of a
perfectly-informed agent but a designer with strict uncertainty, or that of a Bayesian agent and a
designer with worst-case IID beliefs.
We refer to worst-case measures as “type I” and denote them as  I, worst-case IID measures as
“type II” and denote them as  II, and prior-based measures as “type III” and denote them  III.
Variations along the ﬁrst dimension are denoted by footnotes, for example  I
ep vs  I
interim.
For the most part we focus on domains with money rather than domains without money. Rather,
we provide a few comments to suggest how the deﬁnitions extend to domains without money.
3.1 Quantifying via ex post Regret
The ex post regret to agent i at valuation proﬁle v =( v1,...,v n)i s :
regreti(v)=s u p
v0
i2V
✓
ui(v0
i,v  i)   ui(vi,v  i)
◆
, (3)
where ui(vi,v0
 i)=vi(f(vi,v0
 i))   pi(vi,v0
 i), and the utility for agent i with valuation vi given
a mechanism with choice rule f and payment rule p and reports vi,v0
 i. Similarly, ui(v0
i,v0
 i)=
vi(f(v0
i,v0
 i))   pi(v0
i,v0
 i), and the agent’s utility when it reports v0
i.
Given this we deﬁne the following measures of susceptibility:
• Worst-case susceptibility:
 I
ep =s u p
v2V n
✓
regreti(v)
◆
, (4)
which is is the maximum amount an agent can gain from deviation across all possible valuation
proﬁles.4
• Worst-case IID susceptibility: Let   24 (V ) denote a full support distribution, and v i ⇠
IID i( ) denote a valuation proﬁle to all agents except i, where each valuation is sampled
identically and independently from  .G i v e nt h i s ,w ed e ﬁ n e
 II
ep =s u p
vi
 
sup
 
✓
Ev i⇠IID i( ) [regreti(vi,v  i)]
◆!
, (5)
which is the the expected amount an agent could gain from optimally deviating from truthful
reporting on every valuation proﬁle, given a a worst-case IID distribution on valuations and
taking the maximum over all possible agent valuations.
4Parkes et al. [2001] propose a payment rule for combinatorial exchanges that minimizes maximum ex post regret
(subject to budget balance) across all agents on every valuation proﬁle and thus minimizes  
I
ep. Day and Mil-
grom [2008] propose a payment rule for combinatorial auctions that minimizes that maximum ex post regret (subject
to core constraints) across all agents on every valuation proﬁle and thus minimizes  
I
ep. Schummer [2004] studies the
tradeo↵ between  
I
ep and e ciency in two agent, two good exchange economies. Kothari et al. [2005] adopt  
I
ep in
studying the tradeo↵ between runtime, e ciency and approximate strategyproofness for procurement auctions. Bir-
rell and Pass [2011] adopt  
I
ep in studying approximately strategyproof, randomized voting rules (adopting expected
ex post regret, with expectation taken with respect to the randomization of the rule, in place of ex post regret.)
6• Prior-based susceptibility: Given a prior D on valuation proﬁles, we deﬁne
 III
ep =s u p
vi
 
Ev i⇠D(v i|vi) [regreti(vi,v  i)]
 
, (6)
which is the expected amount an agent could gain from optimally deviating from truthful re-
porting, taking the maximum over all possible agent valuations, and where D(v i|vi) denotes
the conditional distribution given vi.
We have the relationship:
 I
ep    II
ep  I
ep    III
ep (7)
For distributions D that are restricted to be conditionally IID, given vi,t h e nw eh a v e
 II
ep    III
ep , (8)
and this is the sense in which the designer’s perspective is worst-case (but distributional) in the
type II measure.
The type II and III susceptibility measures can be immediately extended to domains without
money. First, regret is extended to be deﬁned in terms of a representative utility function,
regreti(ui, )= s u p
 0
i2L
✓
ui( 0
i,  i)   ui( i,  i)
◆
, (9)
for ui 2 U i,w h e r eui( i,  i)=ui(f( i,  i)), for a mechanism with choice rule f.G i v e nt h i s ,
the type III measure of susceptibility in a domain without money would be deﬁned as,
 III
ep =s u p
 i,ui2U i
 
E  i⇠D(  i| i) [regreti(ui, )]
 
(10)
and similarly for the type II measure.5
In place of ex post regret, but still based on ex post regret, we can adopt:
• 0/1 indicator: Deﬁne indicator I(regret(v) > 0), equal to 1 if there is at least one agent with
non-zero regret. For the type I susceptibility measure, a sensible generalization is to count
the number of proﬁles that are manipulable in this sense:
 I
0/1 =
X
v2V n
(I(regret(v) > 0)). (11)
At a proﬁle v where regret(v) = 0 then truthful reporting is a (complete information) Nash
equilibrium. Given this, the measure counts the number of proﬁles where truthful reporting
is not a (complete information) Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if  I
0/1 = 0 then the mechanism
5The type I measure does not extend in a useful way to domains without money because the worst-case regret,
considering worst-case utility functions, will be 1 whenever a mechanism is not strategyproof.
7is strategyproof.6 Alternatively, if the mechanism has a randomized choice rule, then one can
deﬁne, for some ﬁxed agent i,
 I
prob =s u p
v2V n
(Pr(regreti(v) > 0)), (12)
where Pr(regreti(v) > 0) is the probability of non-zero regret to agent i on proﬁle v given
the randomized choice rule. In words,  I
prob is the maximum probability, across all valuation
proﬁles, that an agent has a useful deviation.
The type II and type III susceptibility measures can be adapted to this approach as well. For
example, given a prior D then a simple deﬁnition for the type III measure is:
 III
0/1 = Ev⇠D [I(regreti(v) > 0)], (13)
representing the probability of non-zero regret given the prior.7
• Marginal incentives:D e ﬁ n e i(v)=l i m ✏!0
✓
regreti(✏,v)
✏
◆
,w h e r eregreti(✏,v) is the maximum
regret to agent i at valuation proﬁle v given that it is limited to deviate to some v0
i that is
within distance ✏ (for some metric) of vi. This is the maximal rate of increase in utility for
agent i by making a small deviation around its true valuation at valuation proﬁle v.G i v e n
this, the earlier susceptibility measures can be extended to adopt this quantity. For example,
we could deﬁne the type I measure as,
 I
marginal =s u p
v
 
X
i
 i(v)
!
. (14)
In words, this is the maximum total marginal incentive to deviate across all valuation proﬁles.8
Measures based on marginal incentives are appropriate if agents are likely to deviate through
small adjustments to reports, perhaps coupled with feedback in the context of an ongoing
(e.g., repeated) auction.
• Quantile-based measures: For the type II and III measures, let F  or FD denote the cumulative
distribution function on ex post regret induced by a mechanism, under the IID model   and
prior D model respectively. Given this, we can deﬁne
 III
ep,perc(z)= t h ezth percentile of ex post regret according to prior D (15)
6Kelly [1988] proposed the  
I
0/1 measure for comparing the susceptibility to manipulation of mechanisms. Pathak
and S¨ onmez [2012] adopt a variation on  
I
0/1 in comparing the susceptibility of manipulation of di↵erent mechanisms
for public school choice.
7Immorlica and Mahdian [2005] study  
III
0/1 for stable matching markets and uniform random preferences. Kojima
and Pathak [2009] extend the study to many-to-one markets and also relate the susceptibility measure to the fraction
of strategies that will be truthful in a (complete information) Nash equilibrium in a large market.
8Erdil and Klemperer [2010] adopt this approach in the design of core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial
auctions. They adopt a lexicogrphical design stance: ﬁrst seeking a payment rule that minimizes a variation on  
I
ep,
and then breaking ties in favor of a rule that minimizes  
I
marginal. In domains with money, zero type II or type
III marginal-incentive based susceptibility, can be achieved for generic distributions by insisting that payments are
“agent-independent.” This requires that an agent’s payment is indepenent of its report conditioned on the selected
alternative and removes marginal incentives except in non-generic cases where a deviation changes the alternative.
D¨ utting et al. [2012] impose this agent-indepence requirement and then seek mechanisms that are optimal in a
variation on  
III
ep ,m i n i m i z i n ge x p e c t e dex post regret.
8In words,  III
ep,perc(95%) is the 95% percentile of ex post regret, such that an agent has less
than this amount of regret with probability 0.95. This is deﬁned analogously for the type II
measure, where the percentile is identiﬁed with respect to the worst-case distribution  , that
maximizes z.9 Similarly, we can deﬁne (and analogously for  II
ep,tail)
 III
ep,tail(✏)=1  FD(✏), (16)
for ✏   0, as the probability that an agent has ex post regret greater than ✏.
3.2 Quantifying via interim Regret
In place of ex post regret we can adopt interim regret as the basis for quantifying susceptibility.
This takes a di↵erent informational stance: agents have only probabilistic information about the
reports of other agents, and must select a optimal misreport given this probabilistic model.
A worst-case regret measure is not well deﬁned given this informational stance, but we can
develop type II and type III measures:
• Worst-case IID susceptibility: Let IID i( ) denote an IID distribution over valuation proﬁles
to all agents except i, deﬁned according to  .G i v et h i s ,w ed e ﬁ n e :
 II
interim =s u p
vi2V,v0
i2V, 
✓
EIID i( )
⇥
ui(v0
i,v  i)
⇤
  EIID i( ) [ui(vi,v  i)]
◆
, (17)
which is the maximum expected amount an agent could gain by deviating from truthfulness
over all possible valuations, given a worst-case IID distribution on valuations for other agents,
and restricting the agent to select a single misreport v0
i for all realizations v i.10
• Prior-based susceptibility: Given a prior D on valuation proﬁles, we deﬁne
 III
interim =s u p
vi2V,v0
i2V
✓
ED(v i|vi)
⇥
ui(v0
i,v  i)
⇤
  ED(v i|vi) [ui(vi,v  i)]
◆
, (18)
where D(v i|vi) denotes the conditional distribution, given agent i’s valuation is vi. This has
the same meaning as  II
interim except that it is deﬁned on prior D.
For distributions D that are conditionally IID, given vi, then we have the relationship:
 II
interim    III
interim (19)
Moreover, the following inequalities hold,
 III
interim   III
ep ,  II
interim   II
ep (20)
9Lubin [2010] (Chapter 3 and Section 4.8) introduces the percentile-based approach to approximate strategyproof-
ness.
10Carroll [2011b] introduces this measure of susceptibility, and obtains a quantiﬁed tradeo↵ between susceptbility
and economic properties of voting rules; see also Carroll [2011a] for an application to tradeo↵sb e t w e e ns u s c e p t i b i l i t y
and e ciency in double auctions.
9As with ex post regret based measures, these susceptibility measures can be generalized to
domains without money. For example,
 II
interim =s u p
 i2L, 0
i2L,ui2U i, 
✓
EIID i( )
⇥
ui( 0
i,  i)
⇤
  EIID i( ) [ui( i,  i)]
◆
, (21)
and similarly for  III
interim. The measure is now deﬁned in terms of the supremum over all utility
functions that are representative of an agent’s preferences.
The variations explored in the context of ex post regret can also be adopted here, including 0/1,
marginal-incentives and quantile-based measures.
3.3 Quantifying via Reference
In domains with money, an alternative measure of susceptibility is provided by the divergence
between the distribution on payments in a mechanism and its “reference” mechanism.
The reference mechanism has the same choice rule but a di↵erent payment rule, and is strat-
egyproof. For example, the reference mechanism could be a strategyproof combinatorial auction
(e.g., the VCG mechanism) and the mechanism in question a core-selecting combinatorial auction.
For the Kullback-Lieber (KL) divergence, the susceptibility measure (expressed here as a type
III measure) is:
 III
ref =
Z 1
w=0
href(w)log
✓
href(w)
h(w)
◆
dw, (22)
where href(w) is the probability density function on payments in the reference mechanism (induced
by distribution D on valuation proﬁles) and h(w) is the probability density function on payments
for the mechanism under consideration (induced by D). The deﬁnition is easily adapted to a type
II measure; e.g., by adopting the distribution   that maximizes the divergence.
A number of variations are possible. For example, the payment can be normalized by an
agent’s value or replaced by (normalized) payo↵, and the distribution can be restricted to agents
with non-zero payo↵.11
3.4 Limiting Criteria
The ex post and interim regret based susceptibility measures have also been adopted for the purpose
of characterizing mechanisms according to their limiting behavior, for large “replica” economies.
Generally speaking, a replica economy is constructed by increasing the number of agents in a
system without increasing the number of alternatives that are distinct in payo↵ from the perspective
of a given type; e.g., without increasing the number of schools in public school choice, or the number
of di↵erent kinds of goods in a market setting.
Two limiting criteria that have been proposed are:
• ✏-strategyproofness (or threshold strategyproofness): For any ✏ > 0, there is some n0 such
that for any number of agents n   n0,s u s c e p t i b i l i t y I
ep  ✏.12
11Lubin and Parkes [2009] provide an empirical study of this reference mechanism approach in the context of
combinatorial exchanges.
12Roberts and Postlewaite [1976] introduced ✏-SP as a design criterion and studied the competitive mechanism,
in which the mechanism selects an e cient allocation and competitive equilibrium prices on the basis of reported
valuations. See also Ehlers [2004] for a study of ✏-SP in the context of anonymous voting rules.
10• SP-L: A mechanism is strategyproof in the large if, for any ✏ > 0, there is some n0 such that
for all n   n0,s u s c e p t i b i l i t y II
interim  ✏.13
Observe that ✏-strategyproofness (✏-SP) implies SP-L. Moreover, SP-L is strictly weaker than
✏-SP, because it precludes knife-edge cases through its use of distributions; e.g., the competitive
mechanism is SP-L, but not ✏-SP except with additional continuity assumptions [Roberts and
Postlewaite, 1976; Azevedo and Budish, 2012].
3.5 Discussion
Given a particular susceptibility measure, a designer can proceed to identify mechanisms within a
feasible class with minimal susceptibility, or understand tradeo↵s between susceptibility and other
economic and computational properties.
In worst case frameworks, a designer can also adopt the measure in a “strong sense” and
consider a dominance relationship between two mechanisms. For expositional purposes, consider
the following design approach, inspired by  I
ep. Say that mechanism M1 dominates M2 if:
(i) the ex post regret to agent i is no greater in M1 than M2 for all valuation proﬁles, and
(ii) there is at least one proﬁle where the ex post regret to agent i in M1 is strictly less than the
ex post regret in M2.
Given this, then a mechanism is optimal in regard to ex post regret if it is undominated by any
other mechanism. Certainly, a mechanism is optimal in this sense if it minimizes ex post regret on
every proﬁle. Many variations are possible. For example, one can consider dominance in regard to
the total ex post regret across agents, or according to the 0/1 (“regret > 0”) criterion.14
The ex post regret-based susceptibility measures take an extreme informational stance, in that
implicit to the approach is a model where agents are perfectly informed about the reports of others.
Still, their appeal are that they are simple, and a minimal relaxation from strategyproofness. In
particular,  I
ep = 0 implies strategyproofness (as does  II
ep or  III
ep = 0 except for degenerate type
proﬁles.) Moreover, these measures bound interim regret based measures, with  II
interim   II
ep and
 III
interim   III
ep . There can also be a real sense in which ex post regret is a problem, if agents become
informed after the fact about a possibily useful deviation from reporting true preferences. In this
case, an agent could be unhappy or consider the mechanism unfair.
In cases where the guarantees provided by ex post regret measures are too weak or the measures
don’t provide strong enough design guidance, then it makes sense to adopt interim regret based
measures. The informational stance adopted in the interim regret-based susceptibility measures is
more plausible, in that it provides agents with only probabilistic models of other agents. Moreover,
13Azevedo and Budish [2012] introduced SP-L as a design criterion and studied a number of mechanisms. The pseu-
domarket mechanism [Zeckhauser and Hylland, 1979], competitive mechanism, uniform price, and student-optimal
deferred acceptance mechanism are SP-L. The pay-your-bid Treasury auctions, Boston mechanism for public school
choice, and bidding points and draft mechanisms for course allocation are are not SP-L. In deﬁning the large-market
limit for SP-L, the approach is to ﬁx  ,aﬁ n i t es e to fp a y o ↵ types, a ﬁnite set of alternatives that are distinct in
payo↵ from the perspective of a given type, bounded von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, a ﬁnite number of distinct
payments, and then increase the number of agents.
14Pathak and Sonmez adopt this 0/1 criterion and dominance relation in ranking mechanisms for public school
choice. Parkes et al. [2001] and Lubin and Parkes [2009] study the proﬁle-wise minimization of ex post regret for
various statistics on the regret in a proﬁle, for example maximum regret across agents.
11in adopting the type II measure it still avoids any assumptions about agent beliefs, while capturing
this appealing interim rather than ex post stance for the purpose of design. On the other hand, it
seems probable that interim regret measures are more cumbersome to work with, analytically and
computationally, than ex post regret measures (see Lubin [2010] for a discussion); although, see
Carroll [2011b; 2011a] for an analysis of design tradeo↵s in voting and auction contexts. Although
the tight connection with strategyproofness is lost, zero susceptibility under type II or type III
interim regret implies that a mechanism is BNIC.
Both ex post and interim susceptibility measures, can be compared against a cost C>0 of
manipulation. The cost C could represent the cost to an agent for gathering information about
other agents, or the computational (or cognitive) cost of determining an optimal deviation, or the
moral cost of strategic behavior.15 Given this, then a mechanism can be said to be “approximately
strategyproof with respect to cost C” if susceptibility    C. For example, if  II
interim  C then an
agent with arbitrary IID beliefs about the reports of other agents will not choose to deviate from
truthful reporting when incurring cost C for doing so.
Quantile-based measures of ex post regret may provide a useful middle ground between ex post
and interim regret measures. Implicit to type II and III ex post measures are that an agent can
capture the expected, ex post regret, given a distribution on reports of other agents. But this
is likely an unreasonably pessimistic assumption given the informational stance of ex post regret.
In comparison, the quantile-based approach allows a designer to adopt the ex post regret at a
particular percentile as a simple proxy for the idea that agents will in fact not be fully informed
about the reports of other agents. For example, a design that achieves a negligible ex post regret
at the 75% percentile may be useful in practice, since agents only have a non-neglible ex post regret
with probability 0.25. Despite some experimental support,16 there is as yet no theory to formalize
the connection between quantile-based, ex post measures and interim measures.
In adopting divergence between the payments of a mechanism and those of a strategyproof
mechanism with the same choice rule, the reference-based approach is motivated by the same in-
formational stance as interim regret— a mechanism is adjudged to be robust against manipulation
if the rules of the mechanism are similar, in distribution to those of the reference. An advantage
enjoyed over interim regret measures is that it ﬁnesses the need to analyze (or compute) opti-
mal (interim) misreports. In addition to some experimental support [Lubin and Parkes, 2009],a
theoretical analysis bounds a variation on  III
interim (which takes the expectation on vi rather than
“supvi”) in terms of the KL-divergence in this reference-mechanism sense [Lubin, 2010, section
4.7]. Still, there remains an opportunity for the development of additional theory to explain and
interpret this approach.
Approaches that adopt 0/1 indicators, for example counting proﬁles with non-zero regret, are
probably too crude to provide normative design guidance. On the other hand, they have been
demonstrated to have positive value, and can explain a number of mechanism designs that appear
in practice [Pathak and S¨ onmez, 2012]. The design of randomized mechanisms with a parameter
that makes a tradeo↵ between the probability that an agent has non-zero regret and economic and
computational properties has enabled positive theoretical results [Archer et al., 2003].
15Schummer [2004] made some remarks about the possibile role of moral cost in precluding deviations from truthful
behavior.
16Lubin [2010, section 4.8] identiﬁes payment rules for combinatorial exchanges that achieve low ex post regret at
the 70% or 80% percentile by maximizing the number of agents with zero regret. These same rules achieve Bayes-
Nash equilibrium (in restricted strategy spaces, for reasons of computational tractability) with small divergence from
truthful strategies.
12Considerations in regard to marginal incentives are probably important in practice, at least as a
secondary consideration. Susceptibility measures deﬁned in these terms capture a deﬁning feature
of many mechanisms found in real-world domains with money— namely, the payment does not
depend directly on an agent’s bid, and thus there is no marginal incentive to deviate except on
boundaries between alternatives.
4 Limited Rationality and Tolerable Manipulability
In this section, we survey additional approaches to approximate strategyproofness. Rather than
build from quantitative measures of susceptibility to manipulation, these approaches are more
qualitiative in nature.
For example, they include methods in which explicit models of limited agent rationality are
adopted, and those of tolerable manipulability — which looks to establish that a mechanism will
have good properties despite the possibility that agents will ﬁnd useful manipulations.
4.1 Limited-rationality approaches
A number of approaches have been developed that seek to formalize the idea that approximate
strategyproofness can be acceptable in practice due to limited agent rationality in identifying op-
timal deviations. These approaches to modeling the interaction between limited-rationality and
approximate strategyproofness include:
• Computational resistance: A mechanism is worst-case computationally resistant to manipu-
lation if deciding whether an agent has non-zero regret is NP-hard.17 Based on the standard
complexity assumption of P 6= NP, this implies that there any algorithm would require expo-
nential time to identify a useful deviation on some instances. Recognizing that this complexity
measure is likely too coarse to be e↵ective in practice, alternate approaches emphasize as a
design criterion that mechanisms not be easy to manipulate in the average case, for any plau-
sible distribution on preference proﬁles. See Faliszewski and Procaccia [2010] for a recent
survey.
• Price-taking behavior: In domains with money, a model of limited rationality is to assume
price-taking behavior of agents. This stipulates that an agent will behave as if it does not
a↵ect prices, and make a truthful report about its valuation as long as the alternative that is
selected by the mechanism maximizes its utility at the prices and with respect to its valuation
function. Parkes and Ungar [2000] adopted an assumption of price-taking behavior in design-
ing an e cient, ascending-price combinatorial auction. Another example of a mechanism
that is approximately strategyproof in this sense is the competitive mechanism, in which the
choice and payment rules select the e cient allocation and competitive equilibrium prices;
see Roberts and Postlewaite [1976].
• Feasible truthfulness. Another approach is to limit the reasoning of an agent to only consider
some subset of reports of other agents, and for those it considers not require it to ﬁnd the
optimal best-response. In a general setting of a mechanism where agent’s a message ` 2 L,
17This approach was introduced by Bartholdi et al. [1989] in the context of social choice.
13given an abstract message set L, one way to do this is to deﬁne a partial best-response function,
bi : Ln 1 ! L, (23)
with the semantics “I would report bi(` i) 2 L if the others reported ` i.” This function
is partial, and need not be deﬁned for all reports of other agents. Given this, a message
` is feasibly-dominant (with respect to the partial best-response function), for agent i with
valuation vi, if for every ` i,e i t h e r
(a) ` i is not in the domain of bi, or
(b) the agent’s utility is better from ` than bi(` i).
Either the agent is unaware of the possibility of these reports from others, or its message
is better than the best it can compute, as represented via its partial best-response function.
Thus, this approach seeks to explicitly capture limited agent rationality.
Let’s further assume that some of the messages allowed by the mechanism allow for
direct reports of valuation, and thus can be truthful. Given this, a mechanism is feasibly-
truthful with respect to some set of “admissible” partial best-response functions if, for every
i and every vi 2 V , agent i has a feasibly-dominant and truthful message with respect to its
partial best-response function.18
4.2 Tolerable Manipulability
Another approach to approximate strategyproofness is to seek mechanisms that have good prop-
erties despite the possibility of strategic behavior by agents. The idea is to analyze the properties
for a set of possible agent behaviors.19 Some approaches that have been adopted include:
• Algorithmic implementation. One approach is to consider a set of strategies S1,...,S n for
each agent, where each Si : V ! V , and then say that a mechanism M is an algorithmic
implementation in undominated strategies of property P if:
(i) the outcome of M satisﬁes P for any combination of strategies s 2 S1 ⇥...⇥Sn and
any v 2 V n,
(ii) for every strategy s0
i that does not belong to Si, there exists a strategy si in Si that
dominates s0
i, such that for every v i 2 V n 1, we have that
ui(si(vi),v  i)   ui(s0
i(vi),v  i), (24)
and (iii) this “improvement step,” of determining a better strategy in Si, can be computed
in polynomial time.
The approach of algorithmic implementation does not require coordination amongst players,
or an assumption on the rationality of players beyond that they prefer not to play a dominated
18This approach of feasible truthfulness was introduced by Nisan and Ronen [2007] in the context of combinatorial
auctions, and operationalized the idea by deﬁning a mechanism with a message space that allows an agent to submit
a claim about its valuation and also an “appeal,” which was a partial function k : V
n 7! V
n.
19The term “tolerable manipulability” was introduced by Feigenbaum and Shenker [2002].
14strategy.20 Still, it is not an equilibrium approach. It may not be straightforward for a player
to choose a strategy from set Si, and an agent may have ex post regret for its choice.
• Set-Nash equilibrium. A related approach is to consider a set of strategies that are deﬁned
such that, for agent i, Ri(vi) ✓ V deﬁnes a set of valuation functions that the agent might
report given valuation vi.G i v e nt h i s ,l e tRi(⇤)=
S
vi2V Ri(vi), which is the set of all possible
reports i might make given that another agent has strict uncertainty about i’s valuation.
The set-valued strategies (R1,...,R n) form a set-Nash equilibrium if,
for every i, for every vi, every v0
 i 2⇥ j6=i Rj(⇤), and every v00
i 2 V , there exists a report
v0
i 2 Ri(vi) such that ui(v0
i,v0
 i)   ui(v00
i ,v0
 i).
In words, this says that as long as an agent believes that all other agents are adopting a
strategy in R, then the agent has a best response in R. Whereas algorithmic implementation
requires that there is a “recommended” strategy that dominates all strategies outside the
recommended set, the set-Nash concept is weaker in that it requires that there is a best-
response in the set given that other agents adopt strategies within the same set.21
• Mixture of Truthful and Rational agents. Another approach models the agent population
with a mixture of truthful and self-interested rational agents. Given this, a mechanism can
be said to be tolerably manipulable with respect to some property P if,
(i) the outcome of the mechanism is undominated in regard to property P (in the sense of
the performance across preference proﬁles) by any strategyproof mechanism when all agents
are rational, and
(ii) the outcome of the mechanism dominates that of any strategyproof mechanism in
regard to property P if one or more agents behave in a truthful way, and the other agents
play an equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism and that some fraction of the
agents are truthful.
Informally, if some of the agents will follow a truthful strategy (even against their own
self interest) then the mechanism’s performance is better than that of the best strategyproof
mechanism. Moreover, the performance of the mechanism reduces to that of a strategyproof
mechanism when all agents are rational.22
4.3 Discussion
The approaches reviewed in this section provide a qualitative counterpoint to the various suscep-
tibility measures. Although they, by deﬁnition, do not provide the same direct opportunity for
making tradeo↵s between desirable properties and properties of approximate strategyproofness,
20Babaio↵ et al. [2009] introduce this approach and apply it to the problem of designing computationally tractable
and approximately-e cient combinatorial auctions.
21Lavi and Nisan [2005] adopt this set-Nash approach for the analysis of the properties of dynamic auctions, where
adopting full strategyproofness precludes auctions with good properties.
22This deﬁnition was proposed by Zou et al. [2010] in a dynamic allocation setting without money. They inroduced
a mechanism with performance that dominates serial dictatorship when some agents are truthful, and reduces to serial
dictatorship when all agents are rational. Othman and Sandholm [2009] had earlier proposed a stronger condition,
with (ii) replaced by (ii’) the performance is better than any strategyproof mechanism if any agent fails to be rational
in any way. This deﬁnition is appealing in principle, but proved to be too strong (with associated negative results.)
15the methods have variously been shown to provide positive (explanatory) power for mechanisms
found in practice or used to expand the design space of what is achievable in mechanism design.
In principle, adopting explicit models of computational intractability is an appealing approach
to approximate strategyproofness— it suggests replacing strategyproofness with mechanisms that
can be manipulated, but where an agent wouldn’t be expected to be able to ﬁnd a useful ma-
nipulation in a reasonable amount of time. However, in the context of social choice, many vot-
ing rules have turned out to be easy to manipulate; see Parkes and Xia [2012] for some excep-
tions. Moreover, random misreports have been demonstrated to succeed with non-neglible prob-
ability given a uniform random preference proﬁles [Friedgut et al., 2008; Isaksson et al., 2012;
Mossell and R´ acz, 2012]. See Faliszewski and Procaccia [2010] for a survey and suggestions for
future research.
In regard to models of price-taking behavior, auction designers do ﬁnd this stance useful in
practice, in order to gain a ﬁrst-order understanding of the properties of an auction. One place
where this is seen is through the design of “activity rules” in ascending-price auctions, which
constrain bids (responding to ask prices) to be consistent with a well-deﬁned utility function.
Secondary support for models that approach approximate strategyproofness through price-taking
agent models can be obtained through the SP-L limit criterion [Azevedo and Budish, 2012],w h i c h
tends to pivot around whether or not prices are “pay-your-bid” or more “second price” in nature.
In regard to notions of feasible truthfulness, the fundamental challenge seems to be identifying
plausible ways with which to model the limits on the knowledge of participants. Speciﬁcally, what
limits the set of admissible, partial best-response functions? For example, should the extent to
which knowledge is limited depend also on the design of a mechanism, with the design a↵ecting
which parts of the strategy space (or possible reports of other agents) an agent commits e↵ort to
exploring and understanding?
Tolerable manipulability is an appealing theoretical approach because it focuses attention on
the performance of a mechanism and de-emphasizes incentive constraints. But looking back at
the ﬁve properties (P1)–(P5), held up in explaining the desirability of strategyproofness, these
approaches will tend to fail in regard to (P1), (P2), and (P5). For a concept such as algorithmic
implementation or set-Nash, normative advice can be provided about the set of strategies an agent
should consider. In this sense, property (P3) is partially achieved. Mechanisms that succeed relative
to strategyproof mechanisms because some participants choose to be truthful (in the sense of the
“mixture” models), even though this is against their self-interest can be welfare improving, but are
not fair to those participants who behave straightforwardly.
5 Conclusions
Strategyproofness has been a very useful, but unarguably extreme, approach to aligning incentives
for the purpose of mechanism design. The research community is now beginning to take seriously
the idea of relaxing strategyproofness in various ways. The goal of this survey has been to describe
the current state-of-the-art.
In summary, we can return to the list of desirable properties of strategyproof mechanisms,
namely (P1) strategic simplicity, (P2) dynamic stability, (P3) advice/fairness, (P4) robustness,
and (P5) empirical analysis, and try to situate the various methods against these properties. Ta-
ble 1 considers these properties, as well as the additional properties, proposed for new concepts of
approximate strategyproofness, namely: (P6) tradeo↵ enabling, (P7) design tractability, and (P8)
16ex
post
regret
interim
regret
reference
limit
criteria
comput-resist
price
taking
feas
truthful
tolerable-manip
(P1) strategic simplicity  ?  ?  †  ‡ X?
(P2) dynamic stability
(P3) advice/fairness  ?  ?  † X??  ‡ X⇤  
(P4) robust performance [ — if succeeds — ]
(P5) empirical/policy  ?  ?  †  ‡ X?
(P6) tradeo↵ enabling XXX
(P7) tractable design XX } X  } X  }  }
(P8) explanatory power XX
Table 1: Summary: Desirable Properties Achieved through Di↵erent Approaches to Approximate
Strategyproofness. Key: Generally, X– yes,   – partial, and missing entry – no. More specifcially:
 ? – if regret low enough relative to cost of manipulation;  † – if economy large enough;  ‡ –i f
SP-L in the limit and economy large enough; X? – if mechanism allows agents to submit partial
response functions; X?? – if the mechanism is resistant, can say “don’t bother to try”;   – can
give partial advice;  } – perhaps, not enough evidence yet.
explanatory power.
Di↵erent approaches to approximate strategyproofness are succeeding in di↵erent ways, and the
right way to relax strategyproofness is still not well understood. For example, we do not at present
have a good understanding of the interaction between notions of approximate strategyproofness and
the complexity of the problem of mechanism design itself. In part, the right approach to approxi-
mate strategyproofness will depend on whether the goal is to gain an analytical understanding of
existing mechanisms or to design (either analytically, or computationally) new mechanisms. These
di↵erent agendas are driving di↵erent approaches, and it seems likely that there will be no simple
“one size ﬁts all” approach that comes to dominate.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Eric Budish for helpful discussions. All remaining errors are our own.
References
[Abdulkdiroˇ glu et al., 2006] A. Abdulkdiroˇ glu, P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and Tayfun S¨ onmez.
Changing the boston school choice mechanism: Strategy-proofness as equal access. Technical
report, NBER, 2006.
17[Archer et al., 2003] A. Archer, C. Papadimitriou, K. Talwar, and E. Tardos. An approximate
truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents. In Proc. 14th
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 205–214, 2003.
[Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002] L. M. Ausubel and P. R. Milgrom. Ascending auctions with package
bidding. Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, 1:1–42, 2002.
[Azevedo and Budish, 2012] E. Azevedo and E. Budish. Strategyproofness in the large as a desider-
atum for market design. Technical report, Harvard University, 2012.
[Babaio↵ et al., 2009] M. Babaio↵, R. Lavi, and E. Pavlov. Single-value combinatorial auctions
and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 56(1),
2009.
[Bartholdi et al., 1989] J. J. Bartholdi, C. A. Tovey, and M. A. Trick. The computational di culty
of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6:227–241, 1989.
[Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002] S. Bikhchandani and J. M. Ostroy. The package assignment
model. Journal of Economic Theory, 107:377–406, 2002.
[Birrell and Pass, 2011] E. Birrell and R. Pass. Approximately strategy-proof voting. In Proceedings
of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI-11), pages
67–72, 2011.
[Blumrosen and Nisan, 2007] L. Blumrosen and N. Nisan. Combinatorial auctions. In N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 11.
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[Carroll, 2011a] G. Carroll. The e ciency-incentive tradeo↵ in double auction environments. Tech-
nical report, MIT, 2011.
[Carroll, 2011b] G. Carroll. A quantitative approach to incentives: Application to voting rules.
Technical report, MIT, 2011.
[Cramton and Ausubel, 2002] P. Cramton and L. M. Ausubel. Demand reduction and ine ciency
in multi-unit auctions. Technical report, University of Maryland, 2002.
[Day and Milgrom, 2008] R. Day and P. Milgrom. Core-selecting auctions. International Journal
of Game Theory, 36:393–407, 2008.
[D¨ utting et al., 2012] P. D¨ utting, F. Fischer, P. Jirapinyo, J. K. Lai, B. Lubin, and D. C. Parkes.
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classiﬁers. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Con-
ference on Electronic Commerce (EC ’12), 2012.
[Edelman et al., 2007] B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz. Internet advertising and the
generalized second-price auction. American Economic Review, 97:242–259, 2007.
[Ehlers et al., 2004] Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, and Ton Storcken. Threshold strategy-proofness:
On manipulability in large voting problems. Games and Economic Behavior, 49:103–116, 2004.
18[Erdil and Klemperer, 2010] A. Erdil and P. Klemperer. A new payment rule for core-selecting
package auctions. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8:537–547, 2010.
[Faliszewski and Procaccia, 2010] P. Faliszewski and A. D. Procaccia. AI’s War on Manipulation:
Are We Winning? AI Magazine, 31:53–62, 2010.
[Feigenbaum and Shenker, 2002] J. Feigenbaum and S. Shenker. Distributed algorithmic mech-
anism design: Recent results and future directions. In Proc. 6th International Workshop on
Discrete Algorithms and Methods for Mobile Computing and Communications, pages 1–13, 2002.
[Friedgut et al., 2008] E. Friedgut, G. Kalai, and N. Nisan. Elections can be manipulated often. In
Proc. of 49th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’08), pages 243–249,
2008.
[Gibbard, 1973] A. Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica,
pages 587–601, 1973.
[Hurwicz, 1972] L. Hurwicz. On informationally decentralized systems. In C.B. McGuire and
R. Radner, editors, Decision and Organization. North Holland, Amsterdam, 1972.
[Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005] N. Immorlica and M. Mahdian. Marriage, honesty, and stability.
In Proc. 16th annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms (SODA’05), pages 53–62,
2005.
[Isaksson et al., 2012] M. Isaksson, G. Kindler, and E. Mossel. The geometry of manipulation – a
quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Combinatorica, 32(2):221–250, March
2012.
[Jackson, 2003] M. O. Jackson. Mechanism theory. In U. Derigs, editor, Encyclopedia of Life
Support Systems. EOLSS Publishers: Oxford UK, 2003.
[Kelly, 1988] J. S. Kelly. Minimal manipulabﬂity and local strategy-proofness. Soc Choice Welfare,
pages 81–85, 1988.
[Kojima and Pathak, 2009] F. Kojima and P. A. Pathak. Incentives and stability in large two-sided
matching markets. American Economic Review, 99:608–627, 2009.
[Kothari et al., 2005] A. Kothari, D. C. Parkes, and S. Suri. Approximately-strategyproof and
tractable multi-unit auctions. Decision Support Systems, 39:105–121, 2005. Special issue dedi-
cated to the Fourth ACMConference on Electronic Commerce.
[Lavi and Nisan, 2005] R. Lavi and N. Nisan. Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring
items. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA’05),
2005.
[Lubin and Parkes, 2009] B. Lubin and D. C. Parkes. Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mecha-
nisms via Metrics on Payo↵ Distributions. In Proc. 25th Conference on Uncertainty in Artiﬁcial
Intelligence, pages 349–358, 2009.
[Lubin, 2010] B. Lubin. Combinatorial Markets in Theory and Practice: Mitigating Incentives and
Facilitating Elicitation. PhD thesis, Computer Science, Harvard University, 2010.
19[Mossell and R´ acz, 2012] E. Mossell and M. Z. R´ acz. A quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theo-
rem without neutrality. In Proceedings of the 44th symposium on Theory of Computing,S T O C
’12, pages 1041–1060, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983] R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite. E cient mechanisms
for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 29:265–281, 1983.
[Nisan and Ronen, 2007] N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Computationally feasible vcg mechanisms. Jour-
nal of Artiﬁcial Intelligence Research, 29:19–47, 2007.
[Othman and Sandholm, 2009] A. Othman and T. Sandholm. Better with byzantine:
Manipulation-optimal mechanisms. In Proc. 2nd Int. Symp. on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT), 2009.
[Papadimitriou et al., 2008] C. Papadimitriou, M. Schapira, and Y. Singer. On the hardness of
being truthful. In Proc. IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’08),
pages 250–259, 2008.
[Parkes and Ungar, 2000] D. C. Parkes and L. H. Ungar. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory
and practice. In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI’00), pages
74–81, 2000.
[Parkes and Xia, 2012] D. C. Parkes and L. Xia. A Complexity-of-Strategic-Behavior Compari-
son between Schulze’s Rule and Ranked Pairs. In Proc. 26th AAAI Conference on Artiﬁcial
Intelligence (AAAI ’12), 2012.
[Parkes et al., 2001] D. C. Parkes, J. R. Kalagnanam, and M. Eso. Achieving budget-balance with
Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges. In Proc. 17th International Joint Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI’01), pages 1161–1168, 2001.
[Pathak and S¨ onmez, 2008] P. A. Pathak and T. S¨ onmez. Leveling the playing ﬁeld: Sincere and
sophisticated players in the boston mechanism. American Economic Review, 98:1636–1652, 2008.
[Pathak and S¨ onmez, 2012] P. A. Pathak and T. S¨ onmez. School admissions reform in Chicago and
England: Comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. American Economic
Review, 2012. to appear.
[Roberts and Postlewaite, 1976] D. J. Roberts and A. Postlewaite. The incentives for price-taking
behavior in large exchange economies. Econometrica, 44:115–127, 1976.
[Roth, 1982] A. E. Roth. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of
Operations Research, pages 617–628, 1982.
[Satterthwaite, 1975] M. A. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence
and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of
Economic Theory, 10:187–217, 1975.
[Schummer, 2004] J. Schummer. Almost-dominant strategy implementation: Exchange economies.
Games and Economic Behavior, 48:321–336, 2004.
20[Wilson, 1987] R. Wilson. Game-theoretic approaches to trading processes. In Truman F. Bewley,
editor, Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, pages 33–77. Cambridge University
Press, 1987.
[Zeckhauser and Hylland, 1979] R. Zeckhauser and A. Hylland. The e cient allocation of individ-
uals to positions. Journal of Political Economy, 87:293–314, 1979.
[Zou et al., 2010] J. Zou, S. Gujar, and D. C. Parkes. Tolerable manipulability in dynamic as-
signment without money. In Proc. 24th AAAI Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI’10),
pages 947–952, 2010.
21